Alternatives to frigates

An interesting history

If we are to pursue a really independent foreign and defence policy that is not shackled to questionable United States and Australian strategic objectives, we should sell or scrap the ANZAC frigates and replace them with more long-range Ocean Patrol Vessels that will protect our - and our Pacific neighbours’ - maritime resources, assist in disaster relief, etc.

In the 1980’s the Navy had planned to replace the Leander frigates with OPVs. However, when the opportunity came to join in with the Australian’s frigate programme, they buried their OPV work from the NZ public and politicians and lied to the country about the specifications of the sort of vessel that would be able to do maritime surveillance work in our EEZ.

Just four years after the commissioning of the first ANZAC frigate a review was carried out to examine New Zealand’s civilian requirements for maritime patrol (Cabinet referred particularly to eight areas: fisheries, resource management, conservation, pollution, immigration, customs, maritime safety, and search and rescue), and make recommendations on how they could best be met. It also examined whether a military maritime patrol capability should be maintained.

The resulting Maritime Patrol Review concluded that a Maritime Co-ordination Centre (MCC) be set up to collect information and manage tasking for all forms of military and civilian maritime surveillance to meet civilian needs in: New Zealand oceanic areas, including the EEZ; those areas of the South Pacific over which we have constitutional responsibilities or other arrangements; the Ross Dependency, and Southern Ocean.

One of its eight recommendations was that, in the context of the review of the future composition of the naval fleet, a sea surface maritime patrol capacity should be developed, including provision for vessels with mid-range offshore capabilities and a multi-role vessel with long distance and Southern Ocean capabilities.

The Maritime Patrol Review led to a new Navy procurement project called Project Protector to acquire three new ship types: a single multi-role sealift ship, two offshore patrol vessels, and four inshore patrol vessels.

Two offshore patrol vessels, Wellington and Otago, were built at Williamstown Australia and superstructure modules were assembled at Whangarei. The 1,740-tonne displacement, 85-metre long vessels were fitted with an MSI-Defence Systems 25-millimetre gun as main armament, and could embark and operate a helicopter. The patrol vessels' hulls were strengthened for operations in the Ross Dependency.

Rather than replace the ANZAC frigates, we should be increasing our fleet of OPVs so that we can better manage our own EEZ, while also being able to make a practical contribution to resource protection and management in our Pacific Island neighbours’ EEZs.

The multi billion dollar “typing errors” - the Navy was happy to tell fibs in order to maintain their ability to play war-games with the US.

At the height of the frigate debate in January 1989 the Ministry of Defence produced a report entitled ANZAC Ship Project that stated that “… the minimum length for pitch limits permitting helicopter operations in the majority of wave conditions encountered in, an beyond, the EEZ is desirably 120 metres, although 110 metres is regarded as acceptable”.

This claim was used extensively to argue that OPVs would not ‘cut the mustard’ in our EEZ.

However, in November 1988 the Ministry of Defence had released to Just Defence a previously confidential background assessment paper. In this background paper the Ministry of Defence advised the Government in almost identical words that “… the minimum hull length for pitch limits that permit helicopter operations in the majority of wave conditions encountered in the EEZ is approximately 85 metres”.

In the 18 months between these two papers, it appeared that the sudden 35 metre change in minimum hull length occurred because the correct 85m figure so severely weakened the case for the ANZAC frigates.

Though heavily censored, the confidential assessment stated that the extra length of the 110 metre ANZAC frigates was only required to accommodate all of its complex weapons and sensors.

When confronted with the discrepancy between the two versions, the then Chief of Naval Staff; Rear Admiral Dommett, acknowledged that a mistake had been made. The “approximately 85 metre” figure was the correct one. The Admiral claimed that the “120 metre” mistake was due to a typing error.

Somehow, out of a whole document the Navy typist made nine crucial mistakes in a single very important sentence. 

This mistake would cost the country many billions of dollars.

Front page of the July 1989 Just Defence revealing the Navy’s plans to purchase Castle Class Ocean Patrol vessels to replace the old Leander frigates. These plans were buried out of view of the public and politicians when the pressure came on from our allies to buy ANZAC frigates from Australia.